Includes bibliographical references (p. [195]-201) and index.

Part 1 Introduction: modelling and bounded rationality; the aim of this book; the state of the art; a personal note; bibliographic notes. Part 2 Bounded rationality in choice: the rational man; the traditional economist's position; the attack on the traditional approach; experimental evidence; comments; bibliographic notes; projects. Part 3 Modelling procedural decision making: motivation; preparing the tools - similarity relations; a procedure of choice between vectors; analysis; case-based theory; bibliographic notes; projects. Part 4 Modelling knowledge: knowledge and bounded rationality; information structure; the set-theoretical definition of knowledge; Kripke's model; the impact of the timing of decisions and having more information; on the possibility of speculative trade; bibliographic notes; projects. Part 5 Modelling limited memory: imperfect recall; an extensive decision making model with imperfect information; perfect and imperfect recall; time consistency; the role of randomization; the multiselves approach; on the problematics of using the model; bibliographic notes; projects. Part 6 Choosing what to know: optimal information structures; what is high and what is low?; manipulating informational restrictions; perceptrons; bibliographic notes; projects. Part 7 Modelling complexity in group decisions: introduction; the model of a team; processing information; aggregating preferences; bibliographic notes; projects. Part 8 Modelling bounded rationality in games: introduction; interaction between Luce players; a game with procedural rational players; limited foresight in extensive games; bibliographic notes; projects. Part 9 Complexity considerations in repeated games: introduction; the model of repeated games - a brief review; strategies as machines in infinitely repeated games; complexity considerations in repeated games; the structure of machine games equilibria; repeated extensive games; concluding remarks; bibliographic notes; projects. Part 1

The notion of bounded rationality was initiated in the 1950's by Herbert Simon. In this book the author defines models of bounded rationality as those in which elements of the process of choice are explicitly embedded. The book focuses on the challenges of modelling bounded rationality, rather than on substantial economic implications. In the first part of the book the author considers the modelling of choice. After discussing some psychological findings, he proceeds to the modelling of procedural rationality, knowledge, memory, the choice of what to know and group decisions. In the second part, he discusses the fundamental difficulties of modelling bounded rationality in games. He begins with the modelling of a game with procedural rational players and then surveys repeated games with complexity considerations. He ends with a discussion of computability constraints in games. The final chapter includes a critique by Herbert Simon of the author's methodology and the author's response.